See also: Asian Americans Not Helped by California's Ban on Affirmative Action
Racial Mascotting
The Real and Imagined Impact of Proposition 209 and SP-1 at University of
California Law Schools
By William C. Kidder
Excerpted from Situating Asian Americans in the Law School Affirmative Action Debate: Empirical Facts About Thernstrom's Rhetorical Acts
Asian Law Journal
December 2000
In Farewell to Preferences? Stephan Thernstrom reviews the
consequences of Prop. 209 and SP-1 for the three Law Schools operated by the
Regents of the University of California (UC): Boalt Hall, Davis and UCLA. [1] He
ultimately concludes that the end of race-conscious affirmative action at UC Law
Schools "has already benefited Asian Americans, who have won 41% more
places in the first-year law-school classes than they did the year before."
[2]
Thernstrom is certainly correct to look to California to study the
consequences of ending race-conscious affirmative action for APA law school
candidates, and not only because of Prop. 209 and SP-1. California has far and
away the largest APA population of any state, and this extends to law students
as well. Thus, if prohibiting race-sensitive affirmative action were to produce
any large-scale benefits for APA law students, this would surely be evident in
California. For example, in 1998, there were 735 APA first-year students
enrolled in California's eighteen ABA-approved law schools, which is over
one-quarter of all APA enrollments nationally. [3] Furthermore, the eight
undergraduate campuses of the University of California--which are significant
feeders to law schools [4]--enrolled a 1999 freshman class where APAs composed
38% of the overall student body. [5] With data now available for three
post-affirmative action admission cycles, it is an opportune time to reexamine
Thernstrom's claims about the effects of banning race-conscious affirmative
action at California's elite public law schools. [6]
A Review of the Aggregate Data
Are APA law school applicants "distinctly better off" [7] applying
to UC after Prop. 209 and SP-1? Or is Thernstrom's argument merely model
minority mascotting designed to make the resegregation of law schools more
politically palatable by deploying APAs as a buffer group? [8] This section will
compare admissions data from the three years after Prop. 209 and SP-1 (1997-
1999) with the three years before the ban on affirmative action in California
(1994-1996).
In total, figures for three UC Law Schools--Boalt Hall, Davis and UCLA--are
presented. The fourth UC Law School--Hastings College of the Law in San
Francisco--is not included (nor was it analyzed by Thernstrom) because Hastings
did not employ race-conscious admissions prior to Prop. 209. [9] However, since
in five of the last six years no UC Law School has enrolled more APAs than
Hastings (in part because it usually has the largest class size overall), the
footnotes will refer to Hastings admission figures for comparative purposes.
Tables 1 and 2 compare the number of enrolled first-year APAs in the last
three years before Prop. 209/SP-1, and the first three years after Prop.
209/SP-1. Each figure in parenthesis is the percentage of each class comprised
of APAs. These percentages are helpful in assessing APAs' relative
representation, since it is difficult for law schools to calibrate their offers
so as to enroll an identical number of students each year. [10]
Table 1: Asian Pacific American Enrollments at Three UC Law
Schools Before Proposition 209/SP-1 [11]
| Year |
Boalt |
Davis |
UCLA [12] |
Total |
| 1994 |
40 (15%) |
24 (16%) |
70 (21%) |
134 (18%) |
| 1995 |
36 (14%) |
26 (19%) |
62 (23%) |
124 (18%) |
| 1996 |
46 (17%) |
22 (14%) |
48 (16%) |
116 (16%) |
| Pre-209/SP-1 Total |
122 (15%) |
72 (16%) |
180 (20%) |
374 (17.4%) |
Table 2: Asian Pacific American Enrollments at Three UC Law Schools After
Proposition 209/SP-1 [13]
| Year |
Boalt |
Davis |
UCLA |
Total |
| 1997 |
47 (18%) |
24 (14%) |
82 (22%) |
153 (19%) |
| 1998 |
48 (18%) |
30 (16%) |
49 (18%) |
127 (17%) |
| 1999 |
35 (13%) |
24 (15%) |
66 (28%) |
125 (19%) |
| Post-209/SP-1 Total |
130 (16%) |
78 (15%) |
197 (22%) |
405 (18.3%) |
Overall, data from three UC Law Schools indicates that there were 405 total
APAs enrolled in the three years after Prop. 209 and SP-1, compared with 374
total APAs in the three years prior to Prop. 209 and SP-1. When one controls for
APAs' representation as a proportion of the total number of first- year seats,
APAs constituted 18.3% of UC Law School classes in 1997-99, compared to 17.4%
for 1994-96. Indeed, the very modest gains that APAs made at UC Law Schools
might merely reflect, at least in part, continuing application trends in
California that would have occurred with or without the ban on affirmative
action. [14] Thus, overall, the ban on affirmative action has resulted in
negligible gains for APA law students at UC Law Schools. While this data is
certainly not evidence of a return to "Fitzgerald's Princeton,"
neither does it come close to justifying Thernstrom's assertion that when
race-conscious affirmative action is eliminated, APAs reap the greatest benefit.
Later in this section I will demonstrate that, in fact, White enrollments
have gone up the most at UC Law Schools after Prop. 209/SP-1. Recall
Thernstrom's claims that APA enrollments rose 73% at the UCLA Law School after
Prop. 209 and SP-1. [15] While this is technically true, it is highly
misleading. APA enrollments did increase from 48 in 1996 to 82 in 1997--as
indicated in Tables 1 and 2--but much of this is accounted for by the fact that
UCLA underestimated the number of admits who would accept offers in 1997.
Because UCLA was experimenting with a new class-based affirmative action
program, it ended up enrolling its largest class (381) in over a decade. [16]
Consequently, UCLA was forced to admit an unusually small class (277) in
1998--including only 49 APAs--in order to compensate for the strains a large
class places on the delivery of legal education.
As indicated by Tables 1 and 2, APAs represented 22% of enrollments at UCLA
in 1997-99 compared to 20% for 1994-96. Moreover, APAs' net gain in the
proportion of first-year seats at Boalt [17] was even smaller, and was
slightly negative for UC Davis. Thernstrom's failure to account for changes in
the size of UCLA's 1997 class also causes his related claim--that minority
enrollment at UCLA went up 18% in the first year after Prop. 209 and SP-1--to
miss the mark. UCLA's unusually large 1997 class did indeed include 132 people
of color compared to 117 the year before. However, the more significant finding
is that people of color comprised 45% of the entering classes of the UCLA Law
School in 1994-96 (making it possibly the most racially diverse elite law school
in the country), compared to 33% in 1997-99. [18] As will be demonstrated in
more detail later in this section, the net result of Prop. 209/SP-1 at Boalt,
Davis and UCLA was that enrollments increased substantially for Whites, were
essentially unchanged for APAs, and plummeted for African Americans, Latinos and
Native Americans.
Unpacking the Composite Numbers: The Example of Filipinos
Appropriately or not, APAs are treated as a monolithic group in the political
discourse on affirmative action. Throughout most of this article, I too discuss
APAs as a single group. Partly, my choice reflects the reality that the social
construct of "Asian Pacific American" imposes conditions upon APAs
whereby people from different ethnic backgrounds are treated similarly as
"Asians" in U.S. society. [19] It also reflects the fact that
admissions data across ABA and UC law schools are not reported by APA subgroup.
However, the impact of banning affirmative action can vary between APA subgroups
because of heterogeneity based on socioeconomic status, educational attainment,
immigration patterns, and so forth. [20]
One example of the adverse impact of Prop. 209 and SP-1 on an subgroup of
APA law students is that of Filipinos, who were also recently included as
plaintiffs in a suit challenging the fairness of UC Berkeley's post-affirmative
action undergraduate admissions policy. [21] Today Filipinos represent one of
the largest Asian subgroups in the U.S., [22] yet relatively few American-born
Filipinos attend college, much less graduate or professional school. [23] The
fact that Boalt Hall's first class after Prop. 209/SP-1 included only one
African American (and a deferral from the previous year, no less) received
considerable attention in the media. [24] Much less noticed was the fact that
Boalt's 1997 entering class included zero Filipinos, as did its 1999 entering
class. [25]
Before Prop. 209 and SP-1, Filipinos were given consideration under Boalt's
affirmative action program, as were some other APA subgroups. [26] Between 1994
and 1996, thirteen Filipinos were enrolled at Boalt. [27] In the three years
since the ban on affirmative action, there have only been three Filipinos
enrolled at Boalt (all in 1998). [28] Some have referred to this as the
phenomenon of being "zeroed out." [29]
In contrast, other APA subgroups have long been excluded from Boalt's
affirmative action plan. For example, in 1975, consideration for Japanese
Americans was eliminated, and the number of Chinese Americans eligible for
consideration was substantially reduced. [30] UCLA Law School appears to have
taken a more inclusive approach, though subgroup information is not reported.
Some might find it surprising that between 1989 and 1993, 126 APAs enrolled at
UCLA through the "diversity admissions" program, compared to 102
through the "regular admissions" program. [31] To put this in
perspective, in recent years many comparable law schools like Stanford and the
University of Michigan have excluded APAs altogether from their affirmative
action programs. [32]
C. Vanishing White Privilege: Prop. 209 and SP-1's Real Beneficiaries
The data presented to this point renders untenable the claim that ending
race-conscious affirmative action greatly benefits APA applicants to UC Law
Schools. It should also come as no surprise that other groups of color did not
benefit from Prop. 209 and SP-1. Comparing the three-year totals before and
after Prop. 209 and SP-1, first-year enrollments at Boalt, Davis and UCLA
plummeted from 174 to 50 for African Americans, from 285 to 158 for Latinos, and
from 33 to 14 for Native Americans. [33] This leaves White applicants as the
main beneficiaries of Prop. 209 and SP- 1's ban on race-conscious affirmative
action.
Tables 3 and 4 display the magnitude of Whites' increased representation at
the Boalt Hall, Davis and UCLA Law Schools by comparing totals from the
three years before and after Prop. 209/SP-1. The reported data combines Whites
with "other" applicants, most of whom declined to state their
race/ethnicity in application materials. However, this reporting format is not
likely to significantly overstate the increase in White law students at UC
schools because available evidence suggests that students who decline to state
their ethnicity are overwhelmingly White. [34] Overall, at the three UC Law
Schools that ended race-conscious affirmative action, Whites' representation
soared from 59.8% of first-year enrollments in 1994-96 to 71.7% in 1997-99.
Table 3: White/Other Enrollments at Three UC Law Schools
Before Proposition 209/SP-1 [35]
| Year |
Boalt |
Davis |
UCLA |
Total |
| 1994 |
159 (59%) |
98 (64%) |
157 (47%) |
414 (55%) |
| 1995 |
168 (63%) |
83 (61%) |
158 (58%) |
409 (61%) |
| 1996 |
165 (63%) |
109 (72%) |
190 (62%) |
464 (64%) |
| Pre-209/SP-1 Total |
492 (62%) |
290 (66%) |
505 (55%) |
1287 (59.8%) |
Table 4: White/Other Enrollments at Three UC Law Schools
After Proposition 209/SP-1 [36]
| Year |
Boalt |
Davis |
UCLA [37] |
Total |
| 1997 |
206 (77%) |
134 (78%) |
249 (65%) |
589 (72%) |
| 1998 |
188 (70%) |
136 (74%) |
201 (73%) |
525 (72%) |
| 1999 |
209 (78%) |
118 (73%) |
149 (63%) |
476 (71%) |
| Post-209/SP-1 Total |
603 (75%) |
388 (75%) |
599 (67%) |
1590 (71.7%) |
... Comparing 1994-96 with 1997-99 at Boalt, Davis and UCLA combined, White
enrollments increased a substantial 20%, while APA enrollments were basically
unchanged. [38] Together, enrollments for African Americans, Latinos and Native
Americans went from 23% of the first-year classes in 1994-96 to a mere 10% in
1997-99, a drop of 56%. [39]
References
[1]. See Thernstrom, Farewell to Preferences?, 130 PUB. INTEREST 34, 39-45
(1998).
[2]. Id. at 49.
[3]. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS,
2000 EDITION 452 (1999). For the curious, the individual enrollment totals are
as follows: Stanford 19, Boalt 48, Hastings 69, Davis 23, USF 29, Santa Clara
62, Golden Gate 28, McGeorge 48, UCLA 49, USC 34, Southwestern 56, Western State
18, Loyola Marymount 105, Whittier 33, Pepperdine 12, U. of San Diego 42, Cal
Western 32 and Thomas Jefferson 28. Id.
[4]. For example, over one-third (92 of 269 students) of Boalt Hall's
entering class of 1999 attended UC. The lion's share of these students, however,
attended Berkeley (38) or UCLA (29). See 1999 BOALT HALL ANNUAL ADMISSION REPORT
(1999). This disparity in access to law school between graduates of different UC
campuses is one reason to be concerned about a second wave of adverse
consequences for underrepresented minorities stemming from the ban on
race-conscious affirmative action. In another couple of years, when Berkeley and
UCLA start graduating classes with dramatically fewer African American, Latino
and Native American students, it is quite possible that a continuation of status
quo admission policies will further stratify UC legal education opportunities
because underrepresented minorities will be disproportionately located at less
selective UC campuses like Riverside, which, in turn, will depress their
admission chances. This is a serious problem, especially considering that the
top three national feeder schools in terms of volume of law school applicants in
1997-98 were UCLA, UC Berkeley and University of Texas-Austin, respectively. See
The Leading Undergraduate 'Feeder Schools' for Black and White Law School
Applicants (chart), in Vital Signs: The Current State of African Americans in
Higher Education, 26 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 79, 85 (Winter 1999/2000). This
is one reason I take issue with Thernstrom's rather rosy assessment that Prop.
209 and SP-1 will actually work to the benefit of African Americans by
increasing Black graduation levels system-wide at UC. See Thernstrom &
Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1626-28
(1999) (analyzing the "redistribution" of Blacks to less selective UC
campuses, and arguing that this will likely produce a net gain in African
Americans graduating from UC). See also James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (arguing that Blacks' and
Latinos' redistribution to less selective UC campuses will produce many
educational advantages).
[5]. See Education: UC's Freshman Class, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1999, at B2
(listing applications, enrollments and admissions to each UC campus). It should
also come as no surprise, given California's demographics, that the University
of California has historically sent a relatively large number of APA graduates
to law school. See LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE CHALLENGE OF MINORITY
ENROLLMENT, app. I (1981) (listing the top three feeder institutions for
"Oriental" law students in 1980 as the University of Hawaii, UC
Berkeley and UCLA, respectively).
[6]. Cf. Thernstrom, Farewell to Preferences?, supra note 1, at 38 ("It
should also be noted that the number and quality of applicants to particular
schools can fluctuate for many reasons, often impossible to discern .... Thus we
should not try to make too much of the changes visible this year."); id. at
35 ("[F]ull data are not yet available, and precisely what has happened
this year is not altogether clear. Whether the patterns visible in current data
can be projected into the future is also unclear."). When Thernstrom
restated the claim that APA law students were the prime beneficiaries of Prop.
209 in the June 1999 UCLA Law Review, 1998 admissions data was available but not
utilized by Thernstrom.
[7]. Id. at 41.
[8]. I selected one prominent conservative who has written extensively on the
issues analyzed in this article. I could have chosen others, such as Lino
Graglia or Dinesh D'Souza. I invite readers to draw parallels between my
critique of Thernstrom and other affirmative action critics. For another
critique of Thernstrom, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the
Marketplace Theory for Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 215 (1998) (book review).
[9]. Hastings has a two-track admissions policy, with about 80% of students
being selected in a "race-blind" manner based on mostly academic (LSAT,
UGPA, etc.) criteria. The other 20% are selected through the LEOP program, which
is also not race-conscious. LEOP was instituted in 1969 and continues to be
based on broad measures of "disadvantage" such as cultural, economic,
educational, familial, geographic, linguistic or social background. While it is
true that most underrepresented minority admits at Hastings are LEOP admits, it
is also true that most--in 1997 it was two-thirds--of the LEOP admits are not
underrepresented minorities. For information on Hastings admissions and LEOP,
see Robert Cole et al., Report of an Ad Hoc Task Force on Diversity in
Admissions, University of California, School of Law, Berkeley 51-54 (Oct. 14,
1997) (unpublished report, on file with UC Berkeley Boalt Hall Law Library)
(reviewing admissions at Hastings); UC Hastings LEOP Information Packet (undated
material faxed by Fran Marsh, Hastings' Director of Public Affairs, Mar. 7,
2000); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1037, 1067-68 (1996); Mark Johnson, Some Say Poverty, not Race, is the Issue:
Class- Based Plan Seen as Alternative, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 7, 1995 at
A1. One important distinction is that while Hastings is a public, University of
California-affiliated Law School with identical tuition costs to Boalt, UCLA and
Davis, it is not under the governance of the UC Regents, and as such was never
subject to SP-1. Because Hastings did not employ race-conscious admissions prior
to 1997, it is frequently excluded from analysis of the consequences of Prop.
209 and SP-1. See Jerome Karabel, No Alternative: The Effects of Color-Blind
Admissions in California, in CHILLING ADMISSIONS 33, 44 (Gary Orfield &
Edward Miller, eds., 1998). For a history of Hastings, including its autonomy
from the UC Regents, see THOMAS GARDEN BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE
FIRST CENTURY (1978).
[10]. Enrollments at Boalt tend to fluctuate much less--between 263 and 269
first-year students in the last six years--than Davis, UCLA or Hastings. See
1999 BOALT HALL ANNUAL ADMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 8. Perhaps this
reflects a more rigid institutional mandate not to exceed 270 students, or that
yield rates are more predictable at more "elite" schools (or both).
See id., at 9.
[11]. See Herma Hill Kay, Dean's Memorandum on Admission Statistics to the
Boalt Community, Corrected Version (Sept. 3, 1999). The figures for APAs at
Hastings are as follows: 108 (22%) in 1996, 63 (15%) in 1995 and 70 (17%) in
1994. See UC Hastings Office of Public Affairs, Hastings Admission Statistics by
Ethnicity and Gender (undated document sent by Fran Marsh, Hastings' Director of
Public Affairs, on Jan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Hastings Admission Statistics].
[12]. One reason why it is important to look carefully at APA's percentages
as well as enrollment counts is that 1999 racial/ethnic data for UCLA is
incomplete. See Kay, supra note 11 (including the following caveat: "1999
ethnic/racial numbers for UCLA are incomplete because ethnic/racial codes for
1,097 applications, 201 admission offers and 52 first-year class enrollments
were mistakenly never tabulated, and the application and enrollment materials
that provide the raw data from the tabulations were destroyed."). My
working assumption is that the UCLA's data management error was random with
respect to race/ethnicity, and that therefore the portion of UCLA's
applicants/admits/enrollees for whom racial/ethnic information was not known
mirror the rest of the class. Given that UCLA had a much higher proportion of
APAs in 1999 than it did in 1997 or 1998, it is more likely than not that my
assumption overstates APAs' representation in UCLA's 1999 entering class rather
than understates it. Given that I am critiquing Thernstrom's claims about the
consequences of Prop. 209 and SP-1, it is more appropriate that I use this
conservative assumption (overstating APA levels) when justifying my position.
[13]. See id. (providing comprehensive 1994-1999 admission data on Boalt
Hall, Davis and UCLA). The figures for APAs at Hastings are as follows: 88 (21%)
in 1999, 70 (20%) in 1998 and 48 (15%) in 1997. See Hastings Admission
Statistics, supra note 11 (providing 1994-1999 admissions data on UC Hastings
College of the Law).
[14]. Data from Hastings provides the best "control group" for this
hypothesis. As it turns out Hastings also experienced a modest bump in APA
enrollment during the same period, despite not altering its admission policy
with respect to affirmative action. In 1997-99, 19% of first-year students at
Hastings were APAs, compared to 18% for 1994-96. See Hastings Admission
Statistics, supra note 11. A second useful control group (but one for which I
could not get data spanning 1994-99) is private ABA law schools in California,
which were not subject to Prop. 209 and SP-1's ban on race-conscious affirmative
action. A look at the 13 private ABA schools in California listed in the latest
two versions of the ABA Guide reveals that there were 495 APA first-years in the
entering class of 1997 and 528 in 1998, a 7% increase in one year. See AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, 2000 EDITION passim
(1999) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE 2000]; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL GUIDE TO
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS, 1999 EDITION passim (1998) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE 1999].
That Thernstrom may have made the logical error of presuming increases in APA
enrollments at UC law schools were directly attributable to Prop. 209 and SP-1
is ironic given that he so strenuously criticized Bowen and Bok for falling prey
to a "post hoc fallacy" when they argued that affirmative action was
the cause and not merely the coincidental correlation of positive social
outcomes. See Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Racial Preferences:
What We Know Now, 107 COMMENTARY 44, 48 (Feb. 1999) ("To assume that
preferences account for subsequent gains is to commit the classic fallacy of
post hoc ergo propter hoc. Once again the evidence tells a different
story."); Thernstrom & Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the
River, supra note 9, at 1618 ("Further, to assume that preferences account
for subsequent gains is a classic instance of the post hoc fallacy.").
[15]. See Thernstrom, Farewell to Preferences?, supra note 9, at 42;
Thernstrom & Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, supra note
9, at 1629.
[16]. See Kay, supra note 49 (listing the class sizes for UC law schools).
See also Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative Action,
47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 486 (1997) (reviewing in detail UCLA's 1997 admission
results); Law School Welcomes Large, Culturally Diverse Class, UCLA LAW MAG. 11
(Fall/Winter 1997) (noting that the 1997 entering class was the largest in over
a decade). Hastings encountered a similar bulge in enrollments one year prior to
this, causing it to admit a smaller class in 1997 and causing APA enrollments
(in absolute terms) to drop 56% compared to 1996. See Hastings Admission
Statistics, supra note 11.
[17]. Thernstrom also claims that APA enrollments went up 24% at Boalt Hall
in the first year after Prop. 209 and SP-1 went into effect. See Thernstrom,
Farewell to Preferences?, supra note 9, at 40. This claim is inconsistent with
the data in Tables 1 and 2, which originate from the UC Office of the President.
As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, there was only 1 more APA student enrolled at Boalt
in 1997 as compared to 1996 (a 2% increase). Alarmed by the discrepancy, I
double-checked the UCOP data against Boalt Hall's own admission reports, and
verified that the numbers in Tables 1 and 2 are correct. See BOALT HALL 1999
ANNUAL ADMISSION REPORT, supra note 4. Consequently, Thernstrom's 24% figure is
either somehow based on incorrect preliminary information, or is the product of
sloppy scholarship.
[18]. See Kay, supra note 11.
[19]. Cf. Gabriel J. Chin et al., Rethinking Racial Divides: Panel on
Affirmative Action, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195, 230 (1998) [hereinafter Chin
et al., Rethinking Racial Divides] (Professor Marina Hsieh commenting:
"There is a perfectly valid truth that, in many instances, all Asians will
be treated alike regardless of any subgroup distinctions. That is the majority
culture. To some extent even Asian Pacific Islanders within the culture, with
respect to each other, have certain broad assumptions that remain true in terms
of external treatment, regardless of internal differences."); Neil Gotanda,
Chen the Chosen: Reflections on Unloving, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1597 (1996)
("[M]ore specifically, if the discrimination against Koreans is similar to
such discrimination against other persons of Asian ancestry, then we have, prima
facie, an 'Asian-American' racial context. This kind of Asian American racial
context is not a subjective creation of Koreans and other persons of Asian
ancestry, but is a recognition of forces at work in American society.").
[20]. See Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism! Affirmative Action, the Family,
and the Dream that is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115, 1127-28 (1996)
(noting that "care must be taken to acknowledge the tremendous diversity
within the Asian American community so that the relative success of Chinese
Americans, Japanese Americans, and Korean Americans will not obscure the very
different situations of the other Asian American groups"); Gabriel J. Chin
et al., Beyond Self- Interest: Asian Pacific Americans Toward a Community of
Justice, A Policy Analysis of Affirmative Action, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 156
n.143 (1996) ("[I]t is dangerous to aggregate all APA groups in a
contemporary 'Horatio Alger'-like American success narrative. In fact, there are
wide disparities in the socioeconomic status among various Asian
subgroups."); Linda Cheng Yee Lye, The Wrong Debate, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 13, 14 (1998) (noting that "the effects of affirmative action and its
demise are by no means uniform across the heterogeneous group lumped into the
category of 'Asian Pacific American"'); Mari Matsuda, We Will Not Be Used,
1 UCLA ASIAN AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 79, 80 (1993) ("When Asian-Americans
manage to do well, their success is used against others. Internally, it is used
to erase the continuing poverty and social dislocation within Asian-American
communities."); Frank H. Wu, Neither Black nor White: Asian Americans and
Affirmative Action, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 245-46 (1995)
("Statistically, the socioeconomic positions of Vietnamese and other
Southeast Asian refugee groups resemble the position of African Americans,
rather than that of whites.").
[21]. See Evelyn Nieves, Civil Rights Groups Suing Berkeley Over Admission
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A11 (discussing Rios v. UC Regents, a suit
brought by the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California, the
ACLU, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, MALDEF,
and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.). See also Pamela Burdman,
Lawsuit Against UC Berkeley Claims 'Colorblind' Admissions Policy is Unjust,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 3, 1999, at A13.
[22]. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47
STAN. L. REV. 855, 892 n.240 (1995).
[23]. See id. at 893. I attempted to get more recent data on this issue.
However, the U.S. Department of Education does not provide information on
educational attainments that was broken down by APA subgroup. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION (1999).
[24]. See Thernstrom, Farewell to Preferences?, supra note 1, at 39-41
(reviewing and criticizing the popular press' coverage of Prop. 209 and SP-1's
impact on Boalt Hall). For examples of the media coverage, see Peter Applebome,
Minority Law School Enrollment Plunges in California and Texas, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1997, at A5; Louis Freedberg, UC Law Schools at Wits' End as Minorities Go
Elsewhere, S.F. CHRON., July 18, 1997, at A1; Amy Wallace, UC Law School Class
May Have Only 1 Black, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at A1.
[25]. See 1999 BOALT HALL ANNUAL ADMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
[26]. See RACHEL F. MORAN, ET AL., STATEMENT OF FACULTY POLICY COVERING
ADMISSION TO BOALT HALL AND REPORT OF THE ADMISSIONS POLICY TASK FORCE
(unnumbered page) (1993) (describing Boalt's target ranges for admission offers
to "Asian subgroups" including Filipinos). Southeast Asian Americans
(Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian) present another example of underrepresented
APA groups that were previously included in Boalt's affirmative action program.
However, I did not separately analyze this group because Southeast Asians were
"confusingly redefined" in 1997 to include some subcontinental
Indians, which makes comparisons before and after Prop. 209 and SP-1
problematic. See Chin et al., Rethinking Racial Divides, supra note 19, at 212
n.55 (noting the confusion in how Southeast Asians were categorized in Boalt
Admission reports in 1997). See also Kaaryn Gustafson, Broken Promises, 13
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4 n.3 (1998) (noting that while SP-1 has had a
detrimental effect on Southeast Asian's representation in Boalt's 1997 class,
the University of California keeps few statistics on APA subgroups).
[27]. See 1999 BOALT HALL ANNUAL ADMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
[28]. See id.
[29]. Chin et al., Rethinking Racial Divides, supra note 19, at 212 (comments
of Marina Hsieh). A parallel phenomenon occurred at the undergraduate level at
UC Berkeley in the early 1990s. Until 1989, Filipinos were included in
Berkeley's affirmative action program, and about 227 enrolled annually. In 1989,
the decision was made to substantially reduce the "preference" given
to Filipino applicants, causing enrollments to drop to an average of 114. Then
in 1993, the Berkeley administration terminated affirmative action consideration
for Filipinos, causing enrollments to plunge to an average of 54. See Karabel,
supra note 9, at 35-36.
[30]. See Report of Special Admissions at Boalt Hall After Bakke, 28 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 363, 366-67 (1977). Specifics about other subgroups, such as Koreans or
South Asians, were not mentioned in this report, or in Boalt's 1993
retrospective on its affirmative action plan. See also MORAN ET AL., supra note
26 passim. The exclusion of Japanese and Chinese from affirmative action plans
in the mid-1970s may explain why APA enrollments dropped overall during this
period at Boalt, UC Davis and UCLA law schools. At the three UC law schools
there were 45-48 APA first-year students from 1972-74, but only 35-39 in 1975-
76, and this was at a time when APA applications were consistently rising each
year. See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GRADUATE
AND PROFESSIONAL ADMISSIONS, app. at F-14 (1977). It is also worth noting that
in the early days of Boalt's "special admission" program, a
substantial proportion of APAs were enrolled through affirmative action. In
1971, only 4 APAs were enrolled at Boalt under "regular" admissions,
compared to 23 under "special" admissions. See Report of Special
Admissions at Boalt Hall After Bakke, supra at 383.
[31]. See Albert Muratsuchi, Race, Class, and UCLA School of Law Admissions,
1967-1994, 16 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 90, 139 tbl.4 (1995).
[32]. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 22, at 855 (discussing the exclusion
of APAs from Stanford's affirmative action program); Chin et al., Rethinking
Racial Divides, supra note 19, at 236 (Michigan Professor David Chambers
commenting on APAs not being included in Michigan's affirmative action policy).
[33]. See Kay, supra note 11.
[34]. See Michelle Locke, Black and Hispanic Admissions Rebound, AP WIRE
REPORT, Apr. 3, 1999 (reviewing UC undergraduate admissions and noting that a
majority of "decline to state" applicants are White); Sander, supra
note 16, at 496 tbl.11 note (reporting that "others" in the 1997 UCLA
Law School applicant pool "appear to be mostly Whites who did not wish to
disclose their race"); Interview with Edward G. Tom, Director of Admission
for the Boalt Hall School of Law, in Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 3, 2000) (reporting
that Boalt made some attempts to identify the racial/ethnic composition of
"decline to state" applicants in 1997 by referencing other data
sources after admission decisions were made. Mr. Tom confirmed that
"decline to state" applicants were "overwhelmingly White"
with a few Asian Americans, and no Blacks, Latinos or Native Americans). The
fact that "decline to state" applicants are predominantly White can
also be deduced from the way changes in White enrollments predictably rise or
fall inversely with "decline to states." For example, in 1999, UC
changed its undergraduate application form to more clearly state that
racial/ethnic information would not be used in admission decisions. After this
change, UC system-wide White enrollments went up by 1,455 and "decline to
state" enrollments went down by 1,741. See Education: UC's Freshman Class,
L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1999, at B2 (reporting admission figures for the UC system
and explaining changes in the application form). This reporting ambiguity
becomes a potentially difficult issue because my goal is to compare Tables 3 and
4, and because "decline to state" applications doubled after Prop. 209
and SP-1. At Boalt Hall, for example, the average number of "decline to
state" applicants in 1997-99 was 537, compared to 258 in 1994-96, at a time
when overall applicant volume went down slightly. See BOALT HALL 1999 ANNUAL
ADMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. If, for example, a larger number of people
of color were to suddenly decline to state their ethnicity after Prop. 209 and
SP-1, then my data would exaggerate the benefits Whites received from the ban on
affirmative action. My hypothetical example, however, is highly unlikely, at
least as far as I can tell.
[35]. See Kay, supra note 11. The figures for Hastings were as follows: 293
(70%) in 1994, 314 (76%) in 1995, and 311 (63%) in 1996. See Hastings Admission
Statistics, supra note 11.
[36]. See Kay, supra note 11. The figures for Hastings were as follows: 232
(75%) in 1997, 242 (68%) in 1998 and 280 (67%) in 1999. See Hastings Admission
Statistics, supra note 11.
[37]. See supra note 12.
[38]. See Kay, supra note 11.
[39]. See id.